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The Negotiated Investment Strategy (NIS) was created by the urban af-
fairs program at the Kettering Foundation as a vehicle for cities to shape their
own future.' The creators of the NIS, in the late 1970's, observed that while
* Preliminary version of this paper, titled "Questions in Search of Answers,
Answers in Search of Explanations," was presented at a Weldon Spring Fund
Intercampus Colloquium on Conflict Resolution, University of Missouri, St. Louis,
October 13, 1987, sponsored by the James T. Bush Center for Law, Social Change,
and Conflict Resolution (University of Missouri, St. Louis) and the Center for the
Study of Dispute Resolution (University of Missouri, Columbia). Funding was
provided by the Weldon Spring Fund. The section of the paper on applications was
taken primarily from C. Moore & C. Carlson, Public Decision Making: Using the
Negotiated Investment Strategy (Dayton, OH: Kettering Foundation, 1984)
(unpublished pamphlet).
** Carl M. Moore is a professor in Speech Communication at Kent State Univer-
sity. A former Fellow of the Academy for Contemporary Problems and the National
Training and Development Service, he is also currently serving as an Associate of the
Kettering Foundation and as a Senior Associate in the Urban Center of the College of
Urban Affairs at Cleveland State University. He is co-chairperson of the Governor's
Commission on Peace and Conflict Management in Ohio.
1. See Kunde & Berry, Adjusting to Resource Scarcity: New Options for Urban
Revitalization, COMMENTARY 15-19 (Oct. 1979); Kunde & Berry, Restructuring Local
Economies through Negotiated Investment Strategies, 10:2 PoL'Y STUD. J. 365-79
(1981); SUBCOMMITTEE ON REVITALIZING AMERICA'S CITIES OF THE COMMITTEE FOR
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most major cities needed help, such help was hard to come by. Three reasons
account for this. First, the assistance that was available to cities, particularly
from the federal government, was often in the form of categorical grants, and
it was difficult to tailor the assistance to the particular needs of the city. Sec-
ond, there was a great deal of duplication of existing programs and a lack of
coordination between them. Finally, cities had not discovered how they might
capitalize upon their own assets, particularly: the facilities that were in place,
the city's infrastructure, and the commitment to the city by people from both
the public and private sectors.
Therefore, the urban affairs staff at Kettering-primarily Jim Kunde,
Dan Berry, and Jim Shanahan, along with certain consultants who had
worked with them in the development of their thinking-primarily Jim King
and Dick Eckfield, recommended that a process be put in place that would: (1)
get the assistance to where it was needed, (2) do a better job of coordinating
the delivery of services, and (3) capitalize upon the city's assets. They believed
that this could be accomplished if all parties who had an interest in the future
of the city met together in order to negotiate a long-range investment plan. It
was hoped that such a plan would set forth coherent, coordinated strategies to
guide and target the investment of time and resources by all public and private
interests.'
My role in the development of the NIS has included three stages. First, I
was responsible, along with James Guthrie Coke, for the conceptual develop-
ment of what came to be called the NIS model.' This model was in response
to seven critical questions that had to be answered before the NIS approach
could be implemented.' Of the seven, the question James Coke and I were
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, THE NEGOTIATED INVESTMENT STRATEGY: A REVIEW OF
THE CONCEPT AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR REVITALIZING CITIES (1980); KETTERING
FOUNDATION. WHERE DOES ALL THE MONEY Go? (1980).
2. See Berry, Kunde, & Moore, The Negotiated Investment Strategy: Improving
Intergovernmental Effectiveness by Improving Intergroup Relations, 10:2 J. INTER-
GROUP REL. 42-57 (1985); Carlson, Negotiated Investment Strategy: Applying Media-
tion to Intergovernmental Conflict, 63:4 NAT'L F.: PHI KAPPA PHI J. 28-29 (1983); C.
MOORE, NEGOTIATED INVESTMENT STRATEGY (1982).
3. See Coke & Moore, Experiments will Test the Procedure, Nation's Cities
Weekly, Nov. 26, 1979, at 38-40; J. Coke & C. Moore, NIS Negotiations Model (and
a few lessons) (Kettering Foundation 1978)(unpublished paper); C. Moore, The Nego-
tiated Investment Strategy (NIS): Essential Elements and Model: Initially, as Modi-
fied, and some Lessons (Kettering Foundation 1981) (unpublished paper).
4. The seven questions, articulated by Jim Kunde, were: (1) Who speaks for the
federal government? (2) How does the federal government determine its priorities for
cities, and what are those priorities? (3) Who speaks for a state government? (4) How
does a state determine its priorities for cities, and what are those priorities? (5) Who
can effectively represent a city? (6) How does a local area marshal its resources for
negotiations with representatives of state and local governments? (7) When state, local
and federal teams are ready to negotiate, what do they do?; Kunde, Moving From
[Vol. 1988
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specifically asked to answer was, "When state, local and federal teams are
ready to negotiate, what do they do?" Figure 1 is a schematic of our original
NIS model.
Mayor writes letter of intent to negotiate to FRC chair
L~ z (copy to Governor)
Mayor, Governor & FEC chair Mayor, Governor & FC chair ORGANIZATION FOR




Teams request information from other tms
CONFERENCE I Teams exchange information INFORMAL EXCHANGE
F_ OF INFORMATION
Teams prepare preliminary positions
CONFERENCE 2 Teams present and comment
on preliminary positions
Local team drafts formal investment ln
State and Federal teams respond n'wPt NEOITINd
157 --- ]NEGOTIATIONS
Mediator facilitates negotiations PROCESS
CONFERENCE 3 Teamsa negotiate final areemnt
City, State & Federal review and adoption of agreement PUBLIC REVIEW &
q 57 -MONITORING OF AGREEMENT
Second, I was part of an iterative evaluation team, charged with the re-
sponsibility of improving the process (if necessary) so that the initial applica-
tions (often referred to as experiments or tests) would be as successful as we
could make them. We did not presume to be Objective, free-standing evalu-
ators. Another evaluation team was charged with the responsibility of con-
ducting a summary evaluation of the NIS, to determine whether it worked
better than the status quo.5 In my iterative evaluation role, I observed most of
Concepts to Tests, Nation's Cities Weekly, Nov. 26, 1979, at 26.
5. See T. Chmura, Analysis of the Negotiated Investment Strategy: Summary
Prepared for NIS Evaluation Panel Meeting (Menlo Park, CA: SRI International,
Mar. 11, 1981) (unpublished paper); D. Henton, Evaluation of the Negotiated Invest-
ment Strategy Experiment: A Concept Paper (Menlo Park, CA: SRI International,
Mar. 1980) (unpublished paper); D. Henton, Evaluation of the Negotiated Investment
Strategy Experiment: A Proposed Research Approach (Menlo Park, CA: SRI Interna-
tional, Mar. 1980) (unpublished paper); D. Henton, Rethinking Urban Governance:
An Assessment of the Negotiated Investment Strategy (Menlo Park, CA: SRI Interna-
tional, 1981) (unpublished paper); S. Waldhorn, Assessment of the Negotiated Invest-
ment Strategy: Summary of SRI's Assessment with Evaluation Panel Perspectives
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the negotiation sessions for the first four applications of the NIS: St. Paul,
MN, Columbus, OH,6 Gary, IN,7 and the State of Connecticut. 8 Table 1 ar-
rays the first eleven applications of the NIS.
(Menlo Park, CA: SRI International, June, 1981) (unpublished paper).
6. See Hamilton, The Negotiated Investment Strategy in Columbus, Ohio, 5:4
NEW ENG. J. HUM. SERV. 22-26 (1985); D. Bertsch, Negotiated Investment Strategy
(NIS): An Evaluation of the Columbus, Ohio Experiment (prepared for the Kettering
Foundation; photocopied Ohio State University, 1982) (unpublished paper); L. Suss-
kind & F. Keefe, A Negotiated Investment Strategy for Columbus, Ohio: The Negotia-
tions Process (1980) (unpublished paper).
7. See Isidore, Plan Modernizes Downtown Gary, Gary Post-Tribune, July 12,
1987, at 1, col. 1; J. Laue & R. Patton, The Gary Negotiated Investment Strategy:
Status of the Agreement after the First Year (St. Louis, MO: Center for Metropolitan
Studies, University of Missouri, St. Louis, MO 1981) (unpublished paper).
8. J. BANTELL, CONNECTICUT NEGOTIATED INVESTMENT STRATEGY EXPERI-
MENT: CASE HISTORY (1983); J. BANTELL, CONNECTICUT NEGOTIATED INVESTMENT
STRATEGY EXPERIMENT: USER'S GUIDE (1983); Stanfield, For Connecticut, the Reagan
Revolution Means More Creativity and More Uncertainty, 15 NAT'L J. 12-13 (1983);
Connecticut Negotiates the Social Services Block Grant 8:4, 9:1 INTERGOVERNMENTAL
PERSP. 38 (Winter, 1983); Heintz, Dividing Scarce Dollars: Competing Social Service
Interests Can Be Negotiated, 43:3 PUB. WELFARE 19-23 (1985); Office of Policy &
Management, A Negotiated Approach to Allocation of the Social Services Block
Grant: A Brief Description of the Process (Hartford, CT: 1983); Office of Policy and
Management, The Negotiated Investment Strategy and the Social Services Block
Grant (Hartford, CT: 1983); E. Armentrout, Evaluation of the Connecticut NIS Ex-
periment (1983) (unpublished paper); S. Watts, A Description and Assessment of the
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PLACES DATE PARTIES PRIMARY FOCUS
(In Order) OF COMPLETION
City Physical
St. Paul, MN 1979 State Development
Fed. Govt. Projects
City
Columbus, OH 1980 State Policy, Eco. and
Fed. Govt. Physical Development
City Econ. & Physical
Gary, IN 1980 State eo phyit
Fed. Govt. Development
State Allocation of
Connecticut 1982 Municipal Social Services
Non-Profit Bloc Grants
County County Parks
Charleston, SC 1983 Municipal and Recreation
Citizens Plan
City Eco. Develop.
Malden, MA 1984 Private and Other
Citizens Community Issues
State




Oregon 1984 Providers Elderly Services
Advocates
State Allocation of
Massachusetts 1985 Recipients Some Social
Providers Service Funds
1985 State Office of
Planning Allocation of
Mississippi 3 Related Depts. Social Services




Oregon 1985 Governor's Task Juvenile Services
Force on Juv.
Serv.
Third, I have served as the facilitator/mediator for a few different NIS
applications. Of the applications listed in Table 1, I was responsible for the
1985 and 1986 Mississippi NIS. More recently, I have facilitated an NIS-like
application in Bridgeport, CT, that developed strategies for educating and em-
1988]
5
Moore: Moore: Negotiated Investment Strategy
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1988
JOURNAL OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION [Vol. 1988
ploying recipients of public assistance, and one in Arapahoe County, CO, that
developed guidelines for annexations and incorporations, criteria to guide land
use development, and an ongoing advisory mechanism. Table 2 briefly outlines





PURPOSE Allocate social services bloc
grant.
PARTIES 4 state agencies, oversight
agency, citizen task force.
PROCESS 4 state agency teams developed
preliminary product; 3 teams,
representing the state agencies.
Oversite agency, and citizen task
force, produced the final
product.




Same as 1985; primary
emphasis to set priorities.
Same as 1985.
6 teams produced the final
product.
Same as 1985; substantial
development of criteria (for




(Sept. 1986 - Apr. 1987)
PURPOSE Develop strategies for educating
and employing persons on public
assistance.
PARTIES City, state, business community,
community providers.
PROCESS 4 teams produced the final
product.
PRODUCT Plan that stipulates
commitments and process for
achieving goals.
Arapahoe County. CO
(August 1987 - Feb. 1988)
Develop guidelines for
annexations and incorporations,






5 teams participated initially; 3
teams produced the final
product.




'.priority board") for enhanced
communication and access to
decision-making.
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The purpose of this article is to share what my experience with the NIS
has revealed about large-scale, collaborative problem-solving. To provide a
context for my "Findings," I will describe the essential features of the NIS
and explicate two NIS applications.
II. NIS: THE ESSENTIAL FEATURES
While the NIS was designed initially to address the needs of American
cities, Table I indicates that it has not been restricted to that focus. In the
NIS, parties with appropriate resources and a stake in the result are convened
to deal with a problem in a comprehensive manner. Mediated negotiations are
used to resolve disputes, settle disagreements, and build consensus around a
comprehensive set of actions. Those actions are outlined in a written agree-
ment setting forth each party's roles and commitments. The agreement is re-
viewed and adopted by each party. The agreement provides for subsequent
monitoring, to assure that commitments are carried out.
NIS assumes that decisions about the allocation and use of public re-
sources can be arrived at more productively if the following four elements ex-
ist. First, all parties likely to be affected by an outcome participate in the
decision-making process. Second, the interests of the parties are represented
by negotiating teams. Third, the differences among the teams are identified
through face-to-face negotiation. Finally, the teams are assisted by a mediator
(throughout the process) in reaching agreement.10
A typical NIS goes through four stages:
1. Organizing for negotiations, the period between the decision to con-
duct an NIS and the first negotiation session.
2. Informal exchange of information, the period immediately prior to
and including the first negotiation session.
3. Negotiations process, the period between the first negotiation session
and the signing of the agreement.
4. Public review & monitoring of agreement, the period following the
signing of the agreement.1"
These stages are illustrated in further detail in the APPLICATIONS section
of this article, which discusses brief descriptions of the use of NIS in the city
of Gary, Indiana, and the state of Connecticut. Following these illustrations is
9. See MEDIATION AND NEW FEDERALISM: PROCEEDINGS OF A ROUNDTABLE ON
THE NEGOTIATED INVESTMENT STRATEGY (1981); D. SACARTO, ECONOMIC DEVELOP-
MENT CONFLICTS: MODEL PROGRAMS FOR DISPUTE RESOLUTION (1985); Warren, Na-
tional Implications of a Negotiated Approach to Federalism, Kettering Exploratory
Notes (Kettering Foundation, 1981) (unpublished pamphlet).
10. C. Moore & C. Carlson, Public Decision Making: Using the Negotiated In-
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the principle section of the article, entitled FINDINGS, which is a description of
some of the things I have learned as a result of my participation in the NIS.
III. APPLICATIONS
A. Gary, IN
In the late 1970's, Gary was a city with a number of urban problems. As
such, it was selected by the Chicago Federal Regional Council, which repre-
sented the major federal agencies, to be one of the three midwestern cities to
try the experimental NIS process."'
The Negotiated Investment Strategy agreement, signed in Gary, Decem-
ber 10, 1980, was the result of an eight-month effort that secured and coordi-
nated commitments of money and actions to produce a comprehensive strategy
for iihproving life in Gary. The agreement called for nearly $250 million in
commitments to develop the city's downtown commercial district and adjacent
residential neighborhoods, to improve transportation facilities, to create ade-
quate housing, and to establish medical treatment and preventive health care
facilities."8
The NIS was initiated by the Federal Regional Council and cautiously
agreed to by the city. The NIS began after the state of Indiana joined the
effort. While it was clear that teams from the city, state, and federal govern-
ments were needed to effectively deal with Gary's problems, the mediator
made a major effort to enlist participation of the city's most influential local
industry, U. S. Steel. The company agreed to join the discussions as an "ob-
server." In addition, the mediator helped expand the state team to include
people who could secure the governor's commitment to the negotiated
agreement.
Selection of team members was relatively easy, since a single authority
was responsible for appointing each of them. The mayor appointed the city
team, the governor appointed the state team, and the head of the Federal Re-
gional Council appointed the federal team. Each included "core teams" for the
face-to-face negotiations at the table and "expanded teams" which provided
advice and counsel to the core teams before and during the negotiation
12. See Gage, Federal Regional Councils: Networking Organizations for Policy
Management in the Intergovernmental System, PUB. ADMIN. REV. (Mar./Apr. 1984);
King, The Federal Regional Council: One Voice for Diverse Interests, Nation's Cities
Weekly, Nov. 26, 1979 at 30-31; J. King, The Role of the Chicago Federal Regional
Council in the Experimental Application of the Negotiated Investment Strategy: Les-
sons from St. Paul, Columbus, and Gary (Palo Alto, CA: PMC Ass'n) (unpublished
paper).
13. The City of Gary, Indiana, A Negotiated Investment Strategy: A Joint
Agreement on Objectives and Responsibilities for the Future of Gary, Indiana (Dec.
10, 1980) (unpublished paper); The City of Gary, Indiana, A Negotiated Investment
Strategy: Supporting Documents (Dec. 10, 1980) (unpublished paper).
[Vol. 1988
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All three teams approved as mediator James Laue who was recommended
by the Kettering Foundation. He, in turn, appointed three assistants to help
perform the various mediation tasks. The teams established rules of procedure
covering the role of the mediator and team chairpersons, communications be-
tween teams, record-keeping, team composition, access of the press, time con-
straints, meeting location, and the opening of the meetings to the public.
Actual negotiations began when the mediator met with each of the teams
separately. Prior to the meetings, the city team issued a proposed draft with
their conception of a Negotiated Investment Strategy for Gary. Although
modified somewhat, this draft served as the focus throughout negotiations.
Each team worked with consultants and staff to raise questions, develop
information, and prepare positions and responses. The initial negotiating ses-
sion, held in Gary, was used to request and exchange information. Preliminary
positions were prepared, presented, and responded to by each of the teams.
Two additional negotiating sessions were held. The teams drafted formal posi-
tions, resolved their differences over the formal positions, and eventually
reached an agreement.
During the negotiating sessions, caucuses were held among key team
members away from the negotiating table. The caucuses were particularly pro-
ductive in resolving differences. Indeed, all formal sessions were strategically
scheduled to last several days each to allow time for such informal caucuses.
The negotiating sessions were held at two-month intervals, so much work was
performed by subcommittees between the formal sessions to devise language
for agreements and iron out details.
The final agreement was signed at a large community meeting. Signers
included the mayor of Gary, the governor of Indiana, and the chairman of the
Region V Federal Regional Council. The captains of the three negotiating
teams and the mediator signed as well. For each of the objectives listed in the
agreement, the responsibilities of each team were identified. The agreement
contained specific steps for implementing the agreement and monitoring the
performance of the parties.
Under the agreement, team captains were to work together on implemen-
tation, assisted by the mediator. That arrangement, however, proved unwork-
able due to changes in the national and state administrations. Nevertheless,
through the working relationships developed during the NIS process and with
periodic assistance from the mediator, progress on implementing the agree-
ment continued. 4
"Six years later," according to a recent (1987) article in a Gary newspa-
per, "the face of Gary's downtown is significantly different, in large part be-
cause of the agreement, known as the Negotiated Investment Strategy
14. See J. Laue & R. Patton, supra note 7.
1988]
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(NIS)."' The same newspaper article also points out that "[tihe Genesis Con-
vention Center, Benjamin Transportation Center, Hudson-Campbell Sports
Complex, and Broadway exit for the Indiana Toll Road are all results of the
agreement. The Hotel Gary, once a vacant and decaying structure, has been
renovated into the Genesis Towers to provide housing for senior citizens.!" 6
But not all of the outcomes were buildings. Rather, as David Marr, a city
official for Gary has noted, "[NIS] was the beginning of a whole new relation-
ship with the state. Everything the state has committed to has been done. The
relationship among the different bureaucracies greatly improved. And the rela-
tionship with the private sector has continually developed."' ,
Not everything called for in the agreement has been realized. "Cutbacks
in federal government programs under the Reagan administration such as the
Urban Development Action Grants (UDAG) and lack of money from the pri-
vate sector ha[ve] prevented some of the more notable programs from
advancing." 168
B. Connecticut
While the goal in Connecticut was more clear-cut, the road to it was
strewn with political pitfalls. The problem was the allocation of the state's
federal block grant for social services at a time when scarce resources had
become scarcer. Fierce competition was expected among government and pri-
vate social-service agencies, and political leaders were facing the sort of "no-
win" situation they like to avoid.
Steve Heintz, then Under Secretary of Connecticut's Office of Policy and
Management, saw the NIS process as a creative new way out of the political
dilemma." Governor William O'Neill committed himself in advance to ac-
cepting and recommending the results of the negotiation process to the state
legislature.'0 When the negotiations were completed, the Connecticut legisla-
ture approved the NIS agreement in the form that it was sent to them.
Team formation in Connecticut posed a different set of problems than in
Gary. At first, the state considered inviting all groups who received social ser-
vice moneys to participate as a single team, but abandoned this approach as
unwieldy. Eventually, it was determined that the two largest groups of
users-the municipalities and the nonprofit service providers-would form two




19. Personal conversation between Steven Heintz and James Kunde of the Ket-
tering Foundation (1980).
20. Personal conversation between the author and Howard Rifkin, then Deputy
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teams, with the state as the third.
Selection of five team members for each of the teams was also more com-
plicated. The state represented eighteen different departments, boards, and of-
fices. The cities and towns decided to depend on two municipal associations to
provide a team. The non-profit service providers formed a statewide steering
group to select their team members and to keep informed about, and have
input in, the negotiations.
Mediator selection was done by representatives of the three teams, who
interviewed four prospects recommended by the Kettering Foundation, and
chose one on whom they all agreed. Joseph (Josh) B. Stulberg of New York
City served as mediator with assistance from J. Michael Keating and Ernest
Osborne.
The state team was the first to outline many of the issues, but all teams
were active in identifying the issues to be negotiated. Virtually all the negotia-
tions were conducted during five intensive negotiating sessions, held between
October and December of 1982.
The Connecticut agreement consists essentially of definitions, criteria, and
guiding principles. The agreement identifies the services to be funded by the
block grant, the monies to be allocated to each service, and the procedure and
criteria to be used in selecting the service providers. All implementation steps
remain the responsibility of state government. Provision for the other teams to
oversee that implementation was made by establishing a Tripartite Committee
to monitor execution of the agreement and to provide for continuing negotia-
tions.21 The Tripartite Committee was appointed by the Governor and chaired,
initially, by Ernest Osborne, who assisted the mediator during the negotiation
sessions.22
In summarizing the agreement, Connecticut's Governor O'Neill has said
that:
[it) was and is my belief that the NIS is the kind of creative response which
Connecticut must make to meet its new responsibilities and burdens.... By
bringing together state agencies, municipalities, and private nonprofit human
service providers, the broad picture of human service needs and resources
could be viewed .... As one who has long believed that those who are criti-
cally affected by government decisions should have some say in how those
decisions are made, I truly feel that the NIS has opened up the decision-
making process in a democratic manner."'
21. See A Negotiated Investment Strategy: A Joint Agreement on Principles,
Priorities, Allocations, and Plans for the Social Services Block Grant, October 1, 1983
to September 30, 1984 (State of Conn., 1983) (unpublished paper).
22. See R. Sussman, The Impact of Implementor Participation on Public Policy
Decision Making (Yale Univ., 1987) (unpublished dissertation).
23. C. Moore & C. Carlson, supra note 10.
1988]
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IV. FINDINGS
The following conclusions and recommendations are predicated on Aris-
totle's maxim that "for the things we have to learn before we can do them, we
learn by doing them." While we read the literature on conflict resolution
before recommending the model that guided the first NIS applications, the
truth is we did not learn very much from that body of writing. We received far
more useful advice from meeting with and tapping the knowledge of those who
had experience in a variety of negotiation contexts, particularly those who had
experience with the then emerging field of environmental negotiations; it in-
volved multiple parties and focused on complex policy decisions. Most useful
has been direct experience facilitating NIS applications.
These findings are divided into the four stages of negotiations (from Fig-
ure 1) and organized around a series of questions. Do not forget that you are
reading someone who feels at least partially responsible for the process and,
consequently, is not fully objective.
A. Stage 1: Organization for Negotiations
1. Why do people participate in large-scale collaborative problem-solv-
ing if they are not required to do so?
People have a sense that their community is not as good as it can be.
They want to live in a better place, but believe that the current processes,
particularly the system of eletoral politics and government, is not likely to
improve things. Therefore, many of us are open to better ways of bringing
people together in order to "build community." We are led by those who see
opportunities for making things better or who feel the pain of the status quo.
Some individuals or groups participate in such processes because they
want power or access to power. The principle motivation for the not-for-profit
team to participate in the Connecticut NIS was to influence, for the first time,
the distribution of funds. The NIS provided them with a unique opportunity to
be involved in a set of activities that affected them profoundly. The city of
Gary welcomed the opportunity to improve the assistance they received from
the state and federal governments. Some people, apparently, would like to cir-
cumvent the traditional paths to power. They participate so they can acquire
governmental authority without having to run for office; they want a short-cut.
2. How do you get people to participate in such processes?
People will be reluctant to enter into new ways of doing business, espe-
cially those who are well-served by the status quo. The paradox is that those
whose participation is most critical to the success of the process, who have the
power to effect a change, are most likely to resist participating. To get people
to participate in large-scale collaborative processes, it is necessary to provide
them with a sense of what they have to gain, of what a successful outcome
looks like. The primary, and perhaps exclusive, motivation for some potential
participants to come to the table is a sense of what can be achieved. They need
[Vol. 1988
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to have a vision of an outcome that serves their interest.
3. Who should be responsible for getting people/parties to participate?
Who provides them with a vision of an outcome that serves their interest?
One of the reasons for having a facilitator/mediator from the outset, par-
ticularly someone with experience handling similar issues in other places, is so
that they can provide such a vision. But, theirs is a limited vision, usually
emphasizing the process gains.
Each NIS I have been involved with had a catalyst, someone with suffi-
cient authority to persuade her/his peers to act and who had a compelling
reason to try a different way of conducting business. Steve Heintz, from Con-
necticut, is a good example of such a catalyst. This lesson suggests that if a
new place needs to be educated about what they can gain from doing business
differently, you would be well-served to bring in one of their peers who has a
sense of what s/he and her/his community gained from using such a process.
4. What, if anything, can be done to circumvent resistance to doing work
a different way?
It took eighteen months, on the average, to get the initial NIS applica-
tions under way. Can that be sped up? Our experience with the NIS in Arapa-
hoe County suggests one strategy.
We were called in to conduct a study of the local situation. Data for the
study (primarily interviews of a large number of key individuals) was gathered
in a timely manner-six interviewers conducted almost eighty interviews in
two and a half days, and the report was issued within two weeks of the data
collection. Less than three months from the start of the data collection, the
mediated process was under way. Our assumption is that those who would
have resisted the process did not have time to block it. Or, at least, key politi-
cal actors did not mobilize resistance. Moreover, there was a sustained mo-
mentum on the part of the interested parties to move to action.
5. Why ask people to function in teams? When do you ask people to
participate as a team, rather than as individuals?
It is appropriate and effective to conduct negotiations with teams when
the teams are necessitated by the political (need for representation) and sub-
stantive (need for wisdom) complexity of the issues. If teams are utilized, usu-
ally there is a need for various capacities on the team, such as experience with
negotiations, to complement the political and substantive criteria. An added
benefit of teams is that they can help groups to organize and articulate a com-
munity position. One obvious example is the participation of the nonprofit ser-
vice providers in Connecticut, who were not organized previous to the NIS.
6. How do you develop effective community participation?
It is difficult to achieve meaningful citizen participation. Often the way
this is done is by having token representation on one of the other teams, such
as the city team. If there is a full community team, the problem is that typi-
cally they are not sufficiently sophisticated about the issues or process to par-
ticipate on an equal footing with the other teams.
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Our experience with Bridgeport was quite satisfying. We wanted a team
to represent the welfare community, welfare users as well as those who served
that population. A comprehensive list was compiled of the various agencies
that served the welfare community and all of them were invited to a meeting.
A small group attended the meeting. We explained what was being attempted,
what the potential gain was from participating, and asked who was not there
that should be there. We invited the original list plus the new suggestions to a
second meeting. After again explaining the project, as well as soliciting new
names, we announced that at a third meeting the community team would be
selected. And that is what happened. At the third meeting the group estab-
lished criteria for what would constitute an effective community team and pro-
ceeded to make the selections. It was a bit awkward at first, but they made
tough decisions that served them well. Technical assistance was provided for
the community team to help them conduct research, identify their interests,
and participate in the face-to-face negotiation sessions. In the Bridgeport NIS,
the community team made an active, intelligent contribution to the process
and product.
7. Who should be responsible for sponsoring such events?
If possible, a neutral party. If that is not possible, distribute responsibil-
ity. Do not allow one party to "foot the bill." It is acceptable, however, to
allow uneven contributions. One of the parties may pay the largest share of
the cost, but the others contribute to the cost. For example, one party's contri-
bution may be to provide for their own technical assistance. One party might
contribute "sweat equity" by assisting the facilitation team or hosting meet-
ings in their facilities. Have a clear understanding of how each will contribute.
The facilitator/mediator cannot afford to have a single client.
Those responsible for initiating the process (a company, a key individual
such as a mayor or governor, or a state agency) are likely to be impatient that
something concrete is done; their investment (usually in time, dollars, and po-
litical capital--others are participating because of their influence) demands
that the process produce results. Such sponsors are likely to trust the process
but are not willing to risk failure.
The best way to illustrate this "fear of failure" is to provide a rare exam-
ple where it was not true. During the Columbus NIS, the Mayor felt strongly
that the principle gain would be the increased interaction within and between
the participating teams, even if the city did not realize substantial new gains
in aid from the federal government or the state . 4 More typical is the reaction
of the sponsors of the Bridgeport NIS who pressed to be sure that the process
was moving toward concrete results, even before, in my judgment, such a focus
was warranted.
8. What is the role of the mediator/facilitator? Can a neat distinction be
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made between process and substance, so that the mediator only needs to have
skill in the process of dispute resolution? Is it necessary for her/him to know
about the substance of the dispute?
First of all, notice that I refer to a bifurcated "facilitator/mediator." In
my judgment, the role is much more like that of a facilitator than a mediator,
but some people better understand "mediator" and even resist the notion of a
"facilitator." The original NIS model referred to a "facilitator," but the head
of the Chicago Federal Regional Council thought that sounded too "Califor-
nia."" At the final summary evaluation meeting for the original three experi-
mental NIS's, he concluded that the role was more like a facilitator than a
mediator. s
If the facilitator/mediator contributes a great deal of knowledge about
the substance of the dispute, it can have an adverse effect. The primary risks
are that too much of the solution comes from the mediator (so that the partici-
pants do not "own" the final product), the participants become dependent
upon the mediator, rather than developing the mechanisms or relationships
themselves that are necessary to produce data and positions, and the mediator
loses the opportunity to function as a neutral inquirer. However, I do not be-
lieve in the process-substance dichotomy. To be effective, the mediator must
be smart about the problem, the people and the landscape. Sometimes the
need to be smart is why there should be a mediation/facilitation team.
9. Is the traditional assumption correct, that a third party should be
called in when the parties cannot resolve a dispute on their own? When, if
ever, should a third party participate from the outset? What conditions need
to be satisfied?
It is desirable for a facilitator/mediator to participate from the outset
when the parties do not have a tradition for working together and when the
complexity of the dispute warrants the cost. Put another way, when are the
parties not willing to incur the cost of not remedying the ill?
10. Should there be one mediator or a mediation team?
A mediation team is appropriate if there should be a division of labor,
defined by the skills of the facilitator and the needs of the circumstances. If
there is such a team, one person should facilitate the joint sessions; it is easier
for people to focus on a single group leader. Joint facilitation is possible if the
facilitators are very experienced and have complimentary styles.
Our recent experience with the NIS in Arapahoe County offers an illus-
tration of this theme, as well as a response to the question of whether a
facilitator/mediator can contribute to the substance of a dispute. One member
25. Personal conversation between James Guthrie Coke, co-developer of the NIS
model, and Douglas Kelm, Chair of the Chicago Federal Regional Council (1978).
26. Remarks by Douglas Kelm, Chair of the Chicago Federal Regional Council
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of our team was asked to consider handling the "dispute" for a number of
reasons: he represented the Kettering Foundation (perceived to be neutral and
experienced in solving complex intergovernmental problems), was a former
city manager, was from out of town (but working in the area), and was
known, at least by reputation, by a few advisors to the county commissioners.
Moreover, he had considerable knowledge about the substantive issues. He was
principally responsible for guiding the study that recommended a facilitated
problem-solving process, developing the teams that eventually participated in
the NIS, and helping the teams to establish the ground rules that guided that
process.
When the face-to-face negotiation sessions began, I facilitated the delib-
erations. The first person, who was so involved in the development of the pro-
cess, was formally viewed as the "manager" of the process. He was available
to assist in the facilitation, but everyone understood that he was primarily
responsible for arranging the sessions, working with external groups, helping
the teams to prepare for the sessions, and was available to contribute to the
substance of the deliberations. He did not abuse that permission, offering few
suggestions, and then only when the parties seemed at an impasse.
11. What are organizational keys to the success of a large-scale collabo-
rative process?
There are three such "keys." Staff to the process, especially to provide the
necessary data/information and to assist the mediator/facilitator if s/he is
from a distance., A steward of the product, someone (probably not just one
person) who ultimately will be responsible for implementation. It is desirable
to determine at the outset who that might be and to involve them as much as
possible in all stages of the process. At the very least, they should be kept
informed about the process. Ground rules to guide the process, that provide
the vehicle for initiating the process, orienting the participants to their role,
motivating participation by providing a vision of an outcome, and providing
permission for the facilitator/mediator to act (by defining the role).
B. Stage 2: Informal Exchange of Information
1. Why is this one of the stages of the process?
The reason we included this stage in the original design of the NIS model
was because we assumed that it would provide a relatively non-contentious
way to begin face-to-face deliberations. Indeed, we assumed that it might de-
lay the formation and hardening of positions. At the very least, it provides
time for the parties to get to know each other in a risk-free environment.
Moreover, if the parties have an opportunity to learn about critical informa-
tion together, they are more likely to use that information to create an out-
come that serves their mutual interests.
2. How much data is enough?
Seldom is there enough data. It is not possible to anticipate all of the
information needs. Also, it is not possible to know everything before moving to
[Vol. 1988
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deliberations. At some point, the search has to be concluded so that agree-
ments can be reached.
Typically, I overestimate how much people know. In the Bridgeport NIS,
we had the first two sessions and then had to make the third session an infor-
mation session when it became increasingly clear that the parties were not
sufficiently familiar with the workings of the status quo. While the information
session was productive and helped move us toward resolution of the issues,
such a session should have been held earlier. It would have been the first ses-
sion if we knew how much the participants did not know.
One way to learn about the limits of knowledge is to interview each of the
participants in advance of the negotiations. Such interviews also help prepare
the facilitator/mediator to perform her/his role. Since this personal contact is
made with each of the participants, facilitation of the sessions is likely to be
wiser.
C. Stage 3: Negotiations Process
1. Can you allow some teams to participate differently from the others?
While ideally it would be nice to hold to a single standard, that cannot
always be the case. Sometimes you have to allow for differences in participa-
tion. In the Bridgeport NIS, all of the parties knew that the team representing
the business interests was critical to the success of the negotiations and was
not likely to enter into the negotiations with the same level of participation as
the other teams. They sent representatives, rather than participate actively
themselves, and only made ceremonial appearances. But, they were well-in-
formed about the deliberations and able to deliver the commitments that were
key to a final agreement. The same generally holds true for elected political
leaders; that is, they are not likely to participate in lengthy deliberations and
will prefer to be represented by others.
2. What are strategies for facilitating more productive inter-group
outcomes?
Move the meeting place. Large-scale problem-solving is not the normal
way of doing business. It is necessary to trick the controls. If the setting is
normal, the behavior will be normal.
Focus. Give careful consideration to how choices are presented to groups.
There are well-defined limits to how many items an individual can be clear
about at any one time. One way I choose to reduce complexity is by focusing
on pairs. For example, if the goal of the group is to set priorities among twelve
choices, ask them whether A is a higher priority than B, whether B is a higher
priority than C, and so forth, comparing each to each other.2 7 Such a proce-
dure enhances the group's ability to focus and to engage in productive deliber-
ations. Also, with the group's permission, remove from consideration items
27. See C. MOORE, GROUP TECHNIQUES FOR IDEA BUILDING (1987).
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that have less importance so that the group can give due consideration to the
items of real concern.
Use the walls. By keeping a "group memory," i.e., recording the group's
work on newsprint and taping the sheets of newsprint on the walls (in their
view), you can allow people to let go of their concerns, in the knowledge that
the idea has been captured. Use the "group memory" to keep them focused on
their ideas, and even to deal with disruptive group members.28 Caution: exces-
sive, non-strategic use of "group memory" is counterproductive.
Emphasize "frameworks," rather than outcomes (or, at least in addition
to outcomes). It is often better to develop criteria for a good decision--or ba-
ses for establishing priorities-then it is to make the decision or establish the
priority. Eventually the decision will be made, but the framework will have
utility beyond the particular decision. The group will have shared and agreed
to commonly-held values that provide the bases for future decision making.
Allow groups to learn together and to educate each other. Groups act on
what they learn together, not on what is known by each of the separate parts.
As I suggested earlier, this is the principle reason for stage 2, informal ex-
change of information.
Make the mess. The facilitator/mediator may have to allow the problem
to become even larger than initially conceived, so that all aspects are ad-
dressed and all interests can be identified and represented. Premature narrow-
ing of the problem may result in a less satisfying outcome. Allowing the
"mess" to be made is one way of helping groups to learn together.
Find the fight. Another reason for making the mess is to help find the
fight; that is, to identify points of conflict that have to be addressed if the
group is to discover a mutually satisfying outcome. Another way to find the
fight is to create an environment wherein the parties are comfortable expres-
sing their self-interest. Everyone acts out of self-interest, but we work hard to
camouflage our true interests.
Appreciate that the parties with the least at stake can play a different
role than the other parties. In the Mississippi NIS, one of the teams histori-
cally had a small share of the social services block grant and had no reason to
expect a larger share. They were able to ask tough, probing questions of the
other teams without fear of retribution.
Help the parties: (1) to become aware of their interdependence; they
would not be negotiating if they were not interdependent, (2) to want some-
thing; power is always ill-distributed. Unless all parties want to achieve some-
thing there is little chance of working out a mutually satisfying outcome-I
am most suspicious when someone says that they really do not want anything,
just to help the others, and (3) to see the importance of keeping their organi-
zation abreast of the deliberations. Negotiations do not occur in a vacuum. It
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is happening during the negotiations than it is to try and sell them a fail
accompli once the negotiations have been completed.
The mediator/facilitator is as limited as are the people who participate in
the process. No process (or facilitation) is any better than the people. You
cannot make people smarter than they already are by using a particular tech-
nique. You can, however, enhance their creativity. If needed, you can help
educate them about options or bring different people and perspectives to the
group.
D. Stage 4: Public Review and Monitoring of Agreement
1. Is a process outcome--one that clarifies how a final agreement will be
reached-sufficient?
A process outcome, at least in part, is probably the norm. Most agree-
ments stipulate what will be done, as well as how the parties will continue to
work together. That was true in Gary and in Connecticut. The problem, if
there is one, is when there is very little or no agreement on what will be the
commitments of the various parties, only on how they will continue to work
together beyond the mediated process. If that is all that could be achieved, the
gain is that the parties will be continuing to work together. The outcome
would be considered insufficient if the parties could have achieved more and
quit prematurely.
2. What can be done to assure a mutually satisfying outcome which does
not merely replace one distasteful bureaucracy with another?
There is probably not a general answer for this question, because each
agreement is so situational. For example, a serious criticism of the Connecticut
NIS is that the Tripartite Committee became a burdensome mechanism. Al-
though by no means a panacea, one orientation that has served me well in the
past is to always try and define the demise of an organization, particularly an
ad hoc organization, at the time of its creation. That way, the group is clear
about when something should go out of business. Unfortunately, that does not
mean we will always abide by such a decision. Most organizations outlive their
usefulness.
3. How important is consensus?
Consensus and collaboration should not always be the goal. Consensus
may not be a realistic goal because it may not be achievable in a realistic time
frame. Building community takes time; often it is not something that can be
managed, no matter how good the facilitation. Focusing on consensus may not
serve the interests of some of the parties. Put another way, it may serve the
interests of some (one?) more than others. In the enthusiasm for accord, sys-
temic problems can be avoided.
V. CONCLUSION
The creation and development of the Negotiated Investment Strategy has
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been both informative and influential. Some of the "findings" should be useful
with a variety of groups, even if they are not utilizing mediated negotiations to
address complex issues.
Jim Laue, who was the mediator in Gary, believes that the NIS is pri-
marily responsible for the relatively recent interest"' in the use of mediation to
address complex public policy issues .30 While there are a variety of influences
on the increased use of mediated negotiation of such disputes, it is reasonable
to conclude that the NIS is an important and influential episode in the recent
history of alternative dispute resolution.
29. The professional interest in the use of mediation to address public policy dis-
putes has surfaced primarily in the 1980's, in the wake of the NIS. Two recent full-
length treatments of the subject are L. SUSSKIND & J. CRUIKSHANK, CONSENSUAL AP-
PROACHES TO RESOLVING PUBLIC DISPUTES (1987), and S. CARPENTER & W.J.D. KEN-
NEDY, MANAGING PUBLIC DISPUTES (1988).
30. Personal conversation between the author and James Laue, Senior Consult-
ant, Conflict Clinic, Lynch Professor of Conflict Resolution, George Mason University,
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